This paper examines the recent commercialisation of the programme-making activities at the BBC in the UK as a major instance of a wider tendency that sees a market logic becoming increasingly embedded in public service media (PSM) organisations. Drawing on ideational approaches to policy analysis, this paper seeks to explain how and why the BBC came to conceive of BBC Studios, a new commercial subsidiary bringing together the majority of BBC's in-house production units and free to compete in the wider market for programme commissions, as serving its long-term interests. It considers how BBC strategists engaged with dominant ideas in UK broadcasting policy on the economic value of the creative industries and the benefits of competition for creativity in television programme-making. It shows how changes to the institutional context over the past three decades, predicated on these very ideas, have constrained BBC's room for manoeuvre.
Introduction
Facing budget cuts and operating within an expanding and ever-more complex media environment populated by a growing number of commercial rivals, suppliers and distributors, public service media (PSM) around the world are striving to remain fit-fir-purpose by adopting new organisational models (see, e.g., Lowe and Berg, 2013) . The solutions being adopted often entail the growing embedding of a commercial logic in their core operations. Noncommercialism has always been a difficult distinction to maintain for PSM organisations (see Moe, 2013; Cunningham and Flew, 2014) . Many of these organisations have long supplemented the funding they receive from the state with income derived from either selling advertising or engaging in various ancillary commercial activities. Since the 1990s, however, PSM have arguably become integrated more deeply into the market. Several dimensions to this process can be identified, including the outsourcing of the programme-making function to private-sector suppliers and the more aggressive pursuit of commercial revenues in secondary and international markets to make up for declining public funding. Although the strategic and financial rationales behind these instances of PSM's encounters with the market are obvious enough, there are questions as to whether the growing encroachment of a market logic into PSM's core operations is in tension with the fulfilment of their public service remit and can ultimately undermine their distinctiveness and thus their very reason for being. 3 Against this backdrop, this paper examines the recent commercialisation of the programme-making activities at the BBC in the UK, the latest in a series of initiatives that have since the 1980s brought the BBC closer to the market (see Leys, 2001 ). In 2015, in the context of the negotiations with government for the renewal of its 10-year Royal Charter 1 , the BBC put forward a proposal to bring together its licence fee-funded programme-making departments under a new wholly-owned commercial subsidiary to be named BBC Studios.
They new entity would operate freely in the market for commissions from third-party broadcasters. At the same time the BBC pledged to outsource to external private-sector production companies a much greater proportion of the programmes it commissions. These proposals were described as 'arguably the biggest shakeup ever to the way [the BBC] operates' (Conlan, 2015) .
The analytical perspective adopted here is one that seeks to understand how the BBC as a strategic actor operating within a 'densely structured context' (Hay 2002: 213) came to conceive of the BBC Studios strategy as serving its long-term interests. Given the harsh financial realities faced by the BBC at the time (more on which below), the move to commercialise its inhouse programme-making structures could appear as a 'no-brainer' at first glance. Setting up BBC Studios as a separate commercial entity would allow the BBC to get off its books the salary of around 2,000 in-house producers as well as bringing in extra commercial income by opening up a new stream of revenues. However, a moment's reflection suggests that things are not as simple as that. For, in the very words of the BBC, programme-making has 4 been 'the beating heart of the BBC throughout its existence' (BBC, 2015a: 8) .
Turning this core activity into a commercially-run operation is another big step towards the blurring of BBC's 'publicness'. One of its unintended consequences could well be to undermine in the long-term BBC's case for retaining exclusive access to the TV licence fee (a tax levied on all TV households) against persisting arguments that this money should be made available to commercial broadcasters on a contestable basis (see Donders and Raats, 2015) . From other perspectives too, BBC Studios could be seen as a self-defeating move. Question marks were raised over the commercial viability of BBC Studios, given that its salary costs at launch would be significantly higher than the sector-average and profitability was hence predicated on BBC Studios winning a large number of commissions.
However, if the new commercial venture proved to be successful, the BBC then would likely face charges of market distortion and calls for the sell-off of BBC Studios to private investors. Finally, concerns were also voiced over the negative impact, if the BBC were to start to produce programmes for its commercial competitors, on public perceptions of the BBC brand's universality and distinctiveness.
Answering why the BBC came to see the BBC Studios strategy as serving its long-term interests is, then, not as straightforward as it might initially appear. Addressing this question requires adopting a theoretical perspective that sensitizes the analyst to the perceptual nature of interests and the centrality of ideas to an understanding of the relationship between actors and 5 the context in which their strategy is forged. As it will be discussed in the next section setting out the theoretical framework, Colin Hay's 'constructivist institutionalism' fits the bill. Drawing on documentary evidence, the remainder of the paper first outlines the background to the BBC Studios strategy and, then, seeks to make sense of it by tracing its origin in major ideational shifts and institutional developments unfolding from the 1980s onwards and by examining how the BBC sought to harness the energy of dominant ideas in UK broadcasting policy to promote what it saw, given the circumstances, as favourable policy outcomes for the next Charter period.
Theoretical Framework
This study is situated theoretically within approaches to political analysis that see policy-making as a struggle over the interpretation of policy problems, for social reality (in keeping with a social constructivist ontology) is presumed to be neither directly nor unambiguously accessible to actors (Fischer, 1998) . This is an intuitive and yet important theoretical insight. As put by Craig Parsons (2015: 446) , the basic claim is that 'how actors think about policy matters, and their thinking is not just a mechanistic function of uninterpreted conditions around them'. A focus on ideas, it is contended, provides 'richer explanations of politics', for 'ideas shape how we understand political problems, give definition to our goals and strategies, and are the currency we use to communicate about politics' (Béland and Cox, 2011: 3) . 6 An important strand of ideational scholarship within political science has emerged out of new-institutionalism, a broad approach to the study of policymaking that, at the most basic level, seek 'to elucidate the role that institutions play in the determination of social and political outcomes' (Hall and Taylor, 1996: 936) . Institutional arguments tend to be structural for they see institutions (broadly understood as the formal and informal rules of a polity) as external constraints that shape human behaviour and political outcomes. Yet, within new-institutionalism there has been a turn to ideas in recent times in order to explain phenomena that, it was felt, a focus on institutions alone could not explain. So much so that a new variant of new-institutionalism, variously labelled as ideational, discursive or constructivist institutionalism (see Hay, 2001 Hay, , 2006 Schmidt, 2008 Schmidt, , 2011 has claimed its distinctiveness from the three older ones (rational choice, sociological and historical institutionalism). According to one of the main proponents, its distinctiveness lies in the fact that while more conventional approaches to institutional analysis, notably historical institutionalism, see institutions primarily as constitutive of ideas, this newer new-institutionalism sees 'ideas as constitutive of institutions even if shaped by them' (Schmidt, 2011: 53) . From this perspective, then, 'ideas are the foundation of institutions' and are embedded in their design and development (Béland and Cox, 2011: 9) .
Here I draw in particular on Colin Hay's 'constructivist institutionalism' (see Hay, 2002 Hay, , 2006 Hay, , 2011 . Hay sees actors (whether individual or collective) as being broadly purposeful and strategic, 'seeking to realize 7 certain complex, contingent, and constantly changing goals' (Hay, 2006: 63) .
The social constructivism of Hay's constructivist institutionalism is most apparent in his treatment of interests (see in particular Hay, 2011) . Rather than being materially given as in positivist accounts of political phenomena, interests are seen by Hay as being discursively constituted. Actors' perceived interests are thus not a direct representation of their material interests. In the words of Vivien Schmidt (2011: 58) , another leading exponent of this strand of new-institutionalism, 'interests cannot be separated from ideas about interests' and are best understood 'as subjective responses to material conditions'. Rather than a given, interests are then taken by discursive institutionalists as 'their subject of inquiry' (Schmidt, 2011: 58) -the explanandum. The strategies that actors pursue (and the interests informing those strategies) are, as Hay puts it, 'irremediably a perceptual matter' (Hay, 2002: 194) for actors cannot be assumed to be blessed with perfect information about the context in which they find themselves, and hence 'they must rely on perceptions of that context that are, at best, incomplete and that might often prove to have been inaccurate after the event' (Hay, 2006: 63) .
It follows logically from this that within such a theoretical construct ideas are granted a crucial space. Understood as cognitive or normative beliefs, ideas provide 'the point of mediation between actors and their environment' (Hay, 2002: 209-210) . Context and conduct (and thus the material and the ideational) are dialectically related. On the one hand, the context is selective of strategy, 'in the sense that, given a specific context, only certain courses of 8 strategic action are available to actors and only some of these are likely to see actors realise their intentions' (Hay, 2002: 209) . The context also places constraints upon the discursive constructions of the context (that is, upon the ideas we hold about it). This is because 'for particular ideas, narratives and paradigms to continue to provide cognitive templates through which actors interpret the world, they must retain a certain resonance with those actors' direct and mediated experience' (Hay, 2002: 212) .
However, the direction of influence is two-way. For if 'it is the ideas that actors hold about the context in which they find themselves rather than the context itself which informs the way in which actors behave' (Hay and Rosamund, 2002: 148) , then through the strategic action they inform, ideas (no matter how ill-informed), 'exert their own effect upon the development of the context over time' (Hay, 2002: 214) . Hay illustrates this central point in his theoretical construct by considering the material effects (cuts to corporate taxes) produced by dominant (but empirically challenged) discursive constructions of globalisation as an external economic constraint with attendant political imperatives (Hay and Rosamund, 2002) . The conclusion, supportive of the claim that 'ideas matter', is that 'whether the globalization thesis is "true" or not may matter far less than whether it is deemed to be true (or, quite possibly, just useful) by those employing it' (Hay and Rosamund, 2002: 148) .
At this point, however, the question arises as to how actors come to think what they think. Hay's answer is to acknowledge both 'ideational agency' and 9 'ideational structures' (providing actors with cognitive and normative filters through which they come to see the world). Actors operate within the terms of the political discourse prevailing at any given time and place, lending greater legitimacy to certain social interests over others and shaping what actors perceive to be 'feasible, legitimate, possible, and desirable' (Hay, 2006: 65) .
However, in a move that tempers the structuralism of this position, Hay acknowledges that 'it is actors, after all, who fashion understandings and offer legitimations of their conduct, even if they do so in discursive circumstances which are not of their own choosing' (Hay and Rosamund, 2002: 151) .
Finally, it is important to note that a theoretical perspective that rejects the notion of material interests and accords ideas a more central role in explanations of political outcomes is not at odds with one that concedes that actors may appeal to ideas disingenuously in order to legitimise policies pursued for quite distinct ends. This eventuality is consistent with the notion that ideas 'matters'. Glossing over the methodological problems in seeking to establish whether the public statements of political actors reflect their genuine beliefs, Hay argues that ideas matter not only when they are genuinely held by actors but also in situations likely to be characterized by actors' strategic appeal to ideas, for appealing to certain ideas, as in the illustration of the globalisation thesis, can render politically more viable policies that might not otherwise be deemed legitimate (Hay and Rosamund, 2002: 165) .
As a framework for analysis, Hay's constructivist institutionalism sensitizes the analyst to the dialectical relationship between the material and 10 the ideational, to the perceptual nature of interests and strategy, to the mediating role of ideas and their institutional embedding. Informed by this theoretical understanding, the paper will examine how the BBC as a strategic actor seeking to secure its future in the next Charter period on the most possible favourable terms accessed the 'densely structured context' (Hay 2002: 213) in which it found itself. Before doing that, however, the next section outlines the BBC Studios Strategy in greater detail and considers it in relation to the core funding issues faced by the BBC.
The BBC Studios Strategy in Context
In the last thirty years, funding, more than governance, has arguably been the the BBC, recommended that the UK television system should move in the long run to a subscription-based funding model. As a corollary to this strategy, the BBC has also firmly opposed periodically resurfacing proposals to turn the licence fee into a contestable scheme, claiming exclusive access to this source of income (Donders and Rats, 2015) . The BBC's 1992 Royal Charter manifesto stated that 'the licence fee will remain the most appropriate way of funding the BBC's core services' (BBC, 1992: 66) . Ten years later, in the subsequent round of Charter renewal, the same conclusion was reached: 'the licence fee funding remains the best way of paying for the BBC for the foreseeable future' and 'the superficial attractions of competition for licence fee funding are heavily outweighed by its drawbacks' (BBC, 2004: 112) . Thus, central to BBC's sense of its own self-interest has been the preference accorded to the licence fee as a mechanism to finance its core services over alternatives such as subscription -a position that has so far continued to command sufficiently large support across the political spectrum.
There has been, however, another major plank in BBC's funding strategy.
Ever since the early 1990s, the BBC has sought to supplement the licence fee with commercial revenues generated primarily through the exploitation of BBC's intellectual property (IP) in secondary and international markets. The BBC has justified this strategy on the ground that its commercial activities maximise the value of the licence fee investment in programmes, and that any profits generated are re-invested in its public service activities for the ultimate benefit of licence fee payers. The bulk of BBC's commercial income is 12 generated by BBC Worldwide, a wholly-owned commercial subsidiary running subscription-based channels both domestically and internationally and selling BBC TV programmes around the world. Though successful in securing the continuation of the licence fee scheme, for most of the past three decades the BBC has experienced a decrease in real-value terms in the level of the licence fee. Commercial activities have thus come to be seen by the BBC as providing a much-needed source of extra income. Successive governments have endorsed and in fact openly encouraged the BBC to grow commercial revenues, especially through international activities (Steemers, 2001) . In turn, a fast-growing and globalising media market has provided the BBC (leveraging its international reputation) plenty of commercial opportunities to do so. 13 This is the context in which the BBC Studios strategy came into being.
The idea was first floated by BBC Director-General Tony Hall in a speech at City University in July 2014 (Hall, 2014 ; see also Hall, 2015) . Professing a strong belief in the 'entrepreneurial spirit' and in competition as a force for good, Hall launched what he described as a 'competition revolution' at the BBC, a key element of which was a pledge to introduce 'proper competition in programme supply' by lowering the existing guarantee threshold for BBC's inhouse productions (more on which below), as part of a wider 'compete or compare' strategy designed to improve BBC's efficiency and deliver greater value for money. Importantly, in exchange for offering external producers greater opportunities to compete for BBC programming slots, Hall argued that BBC producers should be allowed in future to pitch ideas not just to the BBC (as under the existing framework) but also to third-party commissioners. Only then, he contended, a level playing field would be created and the full benefits of competition realised. Given the theoretical perspective adopted here, one that emphasizes the perceptual nature of interests and strategy, it is important to note that there were alternatives to the BBC Studios strategy available to the BBC.
Conceivably, BBC strategists could have sought to keep the BBC's in-house production units within the publicly-funded corporation and called for the government to maintain the status quo or even raise the in-house guarantee above the existing 50% level. In order to win support from government, the BBC could have pointed to industry consolidation in the television production sector and increased foreign ownership and vertical integration between broadcasters and producers (see next section). The BBC could have then built a plausible case that these trends were contributing to a gradual rebalancing of market power in the independents' favour vis-à-vis broadcasters thereby weakening the main public interest rationale for the WoCC.
In order to explain why the BBC Studios strategy was preferred over this alternative, the next section turns to a consideration of the wider ideational and institutional context within which the BBC Studios strategy must be situated, drawing on the theoretical framework outlined earlier. It considers how the BBC as a strategic actor engaged with the context in which it found itself, a context shaped by three decades of 'market-driven politics' (Leys, 2001 ) and shows that there were strong path-dependent effects at work that came to delimit the realm of what the BBC conceivably saw as politically feasible.
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Ideas, Institutions and the BBC as a Strategic Actor
The radical restructuring of programme-making as a function within the UK television industry value chain needs to be seen as part of the wider process of marketization of the entire television system underway since the 1980s (Leys, 2001; Freedman, 2008) with no in-house production capacity of its own 'was an important first step in fostering the development of a fledgling independent television production sector' (Doyle and Paterson, 2008: 19) . Whereas the creation of Channel 4
was primarily motivated by a desire to promote cultural diversity and serve minority tastes, competition and industrial policy goals featured more prominently in subsequent policy interventions, which further strengthened the position of the independent television production sector vis-à-vis broadcasters. The Broadcasting Act of 1990 introduced a 25% quota for 'qualifying independents' at the BBC and ITV further raising levels of market demand for programmes produced externally to the vertically-integrated broadcasters. The arrival of Channel 4 and the 25% independent production quota led to the rapid development of a sector that, by the mid-1990s, was 23 comprised of around 800 independent television production companies, mostly small or medium-sized enterprises (Doyle and Paterson, 2008: 21) . was the latest in a series of regulatory changes designed to boost the independent production sector (Nicoli, 2012) .
Contextually
In 2005, the Work Foundation was asked by the BBC to assess the likely impact of the proposed WoCC on BBC in-house production, also in light of the new terms of trade between broadcasters and producers and wider market trends (growing consolidation within the sector). The report warned that at some point in the next decade the BBC was likely to reach 'a tipping point at which it will find it very difficult to justify in-house production capacity on even 24 its reduced relative scale ' (Work Foundation, 2005: 7) . It painted a bleak picture:
The BBC risks a serious hollowing-out as a creative organisation by a rapidly growing and newly empowered independent sector who will be obliged to poach its talent because of the paucity of its own training, while driving a hard bargain over both programme provision and re-use of content in service provision. The independents will increasingly dictate the terms over what kind of programmes they want to make within the quota and WoCC constraints (i.e., low-risk programmes in long-run formats), so that an important section of BBC output will look indistinguishable -despite its claims for public value creation -from other commercial channels (Work Foundation, 2005: 7) The report urged the BBC to resist these trends, but it argued that 'that is exactly what the current architecture is disabling it from doing' (Work Foundation, 2005: 8) . For the BBC to maintain in-house production at a critical mass of capacity, the report recommended that greater regulatory safeguards for BBC in-house production be introduced.
In the following decade, the BBC tried (somewhat timidly) to make the case that it should be allowed to retain more IP either by producing more inhouse or through more favourable terms of trade with independents.
However, the political tide was moving very much in the opposite direction.
Since the coming into effects of the WoCC, PACT vociferously called for the BBC to open up more of its commissioning slots to external suppliers -its ultimate vision being that of a BBC turned 'publisher broadcaster', on Channel 25 4's model (Oliver and Ohlbaum, 2014) . The success of external suppliers in securing the majority of commissioning hours in the 25% WoCC boosted PACT's case, for PACT could argue that a point had been reached at which BBC's 50% in-house guarantee was effectively 'acting as a barrier to further creative competition ' (Sara Geater, PACT, cited in WMF, 2015: 11) .
By 2014, a government-mandated reduction of BBC's in-house guarantee looked a very likely prospect. PACT's case was received with sympathy in policy circles and the idea that competition and outsourcing drive creativity in television production, in spite of inconclusive results of research on the determinants of organisational creativity (see, e.g., Lee, 2011) , went largely unquestioned, except for few voices 4 . Harnessing the energy of that idea (while at the same time leveraging the creative industries discourse), BBC Director-General Tony Hall then promised 'a competition revolution' at the BBC, calling for 'a less regulated system' in order to create 'a level playingfield between BBC producers and independent ones' (Hall, 2014) . In order to achieve this, Hall argued, BBC producers should be allowed to pitch their ideas outside the corporation, for the problem for the BBC under a system of 'managed competition' was that 'BBC Production has only one buyer -BBC Commissioning -which inevitably constrains its opportunities'. More importantly, Hall went on, it had become difficult for the BBC to retain talented people moving to the more lucrative commercial sector, people 'who grew up with the BBC but who now feel they have the freedom to be more creative and Supporting 'a thriving independent production sector' was the clearest illustration of how, the report claimed, this was already happening (BBC, 2015b: 55) .
Conclusion
Ever since the 1980s, UK broadcasting policy has arguably been informed by a market-conforming notion of public service broadcasting. In the words of Des Freedman (2008: 169) , the BBC has come to be seen 'not as an autonomous proponent of public service values but as an organisation that is part of an increasingly competitive, marketised environment and needs regulating according to that logic'. As discussed, one prominent aspect of the 27 wider process of marketization in this sector has been the gradual hollowing out of BBC's in-house production and the outsourcing of the programmemaking function to a fast-growing independent production industry that in recent years has consolidated, falling in the hands of transnational media groups. Arguably, the move to open up the majority of BBC's commissioning hours to competition from external suppliers (running counter the trend in the private sector of growing broadcaster-producer integration), and, relatedly, BBC's plan to commercialise its programme-making operations under the BBC Studios banner, are the culmination of a 30-year-long process. This paper has examined how the BBC as a strategic actor has engaged with dominant ideas in UK broadcasting policy in a bid to preserve its position in the next Charter period. The BBC has countered the influential 'crowding out' argument by appealing to another fashionable discourse -on the creative economy. Portraying itself as 'a great enabler for the creative industry' (Hall, 2015) , the BBC has thus increasingly turned to economic arguments in order to justify its wider societal value, thereby validating a reductive, but increasingly accepted notion of the licence fee as an industrial policy tool -'a venture capital fund for creativity ' (Work Foundation, 2005: 6) .
Whether genuinely or quite possibly out of a strategic calculus, the BBC has also embraced another powerful discourse influencing the policies implemented in this domain since the 1980s -the idea that competition in television programme-making stimulates creativity. Drawing on Hay's constructivist institutionalism, it was argued that changes to the institutional 28 context over the past three decades predicated on this idea created strong path-dependent effects constraining BBC's room for manoeuvre. Conceiving of its long-term interests as best served by a strategy ensuring continuing control over IP in order to maximise returns from commercial activities in the face of real-value cuts to the licence fee, the BBC has embraced the idea that competition drives creativity in order to build the case for the set up of BBC Studios as a separate commercial entity free to compete with other production companies in the wider market for programme commissions. In tandem with the further opening up of BBC commissioning hours to the independent sector, this move was heralded by BBC Director-General (Hall, 2015) as marking the transition from an era of 'managed competition' to an era of full competition. Figure 1 below summarises the main argument of the paper. ITV (self-servingly no doubt) voiced concerns that a for-profit BBC Studios would face strong economic incentives to produce programmes with broad commercial and international appeal, which could jeopardise 'the current noncommercial policy benefits delivered by the BBC's in house production activities' (ITV, 2015: 12) . Such concerns, however, were dismissed by Ofcom in its advice to government (Ofcom, 2015b: 15) The set up of BBC Studios as a separate commercial entity and the move to a system of full competition for BBC's commissioning spend (with the exclusion of news) is informed by a notion that equates PSM with the commissioning, over and above the making, of television programmes. This increasingly given-for-granted notion might well in future lend greater weight 30 to arguments (strongly opposed by the BBC) that licence fee money should become available to commercial broadcasters on a contestable basis.
The two main arguments put forward in this paper -the BBC's growing reliance on economic arguments to justify its value and the path-dependent effects pushing the BBC towards advocating an institutional solution entailing the further hollowing out of its publicly-funded structures -are likely to be relevant to wider debates on the future role and organisational forms of PSM, not the least because innovations in UK PSM policy have in the past transferred to other countries.
